for each possible scenario of subsystems either providing or failing to provide their functions. Input for the technique consisted of:
1. The interdependence of functions performed by the various DSACS subsystems.
2. The expert opinion of functional area personnel as to the probability of the various DSACS subsystems performing their functions. These subsystem scenario probabilities were used as input to a Monte Carlo simulation, which estimated probabilities for DSACS meeting its various objectives. DSACS was divided into two groups of subsystems, those supporting planning and execution and a group of smaller stand alone subsystems. With the exceptions of Industrial Preparedness Planning and Maintenance the stand alone subsystems all have a high probability of success. Completion of the Industrial Preparedness Planning subsystem is dependent on development of a relational data base management system, which will take at least 2 years to develop. The probability the Maintenance subsystem being a usable system, by July 89, is 0.5.
The odds against DSACS developing a system capable of performing planning and execution functions for the entire ammunition base, by Oct 88, are at least 5 to 2. However, some items could be processed using a mixture of automation and manual effort, if certain critical functions in CAPE, NIP and Pricing are provided.
Formal walk around procedures should be developed for those functions which can be performed manually. Based on the number of personnel available to support these function, a determination should be made as to the number of items the system can reasonably be expected to process, by Oct 88.
Priority should be given to developing those functions which directly interface with SMCA customers. This includes all of CAPE and the on-line inquiry functions of Order Tracking, CAPE and the PWD generation function of NIP are critical elements in the development of any type of planning and execution system, since they are essential, have a high probability of failure and no substitute is available for the functions they perform. The Defense Standard Ammunition Computer System (DSACS) was designed to improve the planning, administration and management of conventional ammunition. The system includes a number of migrations of existing software systems as well as new development. The primary technique employed for new development has been rapid prototyping. Although, development of the system began in FY 83, the system analysis office (AMSMC-SA) was not requested to perform a risk analysis until May 87. A networking approach was first selected as the method of performing this analysis. However, attempts to develop the data required for this method failed. Various software cost estimating models, such as COCOMO and System 3, were also considered but none were acceptable to both the PM for DSACS and AMSMC-SA.
Aooession
ise parametric models were based on data from software projects which u d a structured approach to system design. Also, the estimates prqItuced by these models were to sensitive to qualitative, poorly define variables or the models were driven by variables which could not be e0timated accurately.
b.
Objective I ,
The objective of the analysis was to identify unacceptable combinations of probability oi failure and consequence of failure for the various functional areas of DSAC, as currently defined.
c. Sources of Data and Assumptions
The data used in this analysis were based on the expert opinions of personnel familiar with the methods and procedures DSACS proposes to employ as well as the existing procedures employed to satisfy the information requirements of conventional ammunition procurement and logistics support. These experts were selected by the AMCCOM Directorates having responsibility for the functions that will be performed by DSACS's various subsystems. The primary assumption was that the personnel providing data have the expertise to provide accurate assessments of the probability of DSACS performing its functions and the impact of functional failure on the system's objective. Two other main assumptions were that the functions provided by the various subsystems can be interlaced to perform DSACS's objectives and that an error free data base exists.
Methodology
The analysis was based on expert opinion. It assessed the impact of failures in the various DSACS functional areas on meeting the projects performance goals. This approach was used because of the fluid nature of systems specifications when using a prototyping approach to systems design, the lack of data on prior prototyping projects and the inability to obtain the data required to perform this analysis using a bottom up approach. The steps performed to execute this approach follow:
a. In conjunction with functional points of contact (POC), three sets of input data were produced.
(1).
DSACS goals based on the global description and subsystem functional descriptions.
(2).
A list of every possible scenario for the lowest level of each functional area.
These scenarios were based on the success or failure of the subsystem to provide its major functions. (1). Performance failure was based on individual subsystem functions.
(2). Marginal and first order conditional probabilities were provided as point estimates.
c. Probability assessments were made using a Monte Carlo simulation and goal programming techniques.
(1).
Using the axioms of probability, we produced a set of internally consistent probabilities for each subsystem scenario, which had the least deviation from the elicited probabilities.
(2). The subsystem scenario probabilities were used as input to a Monte Carlo simulation, which estimated probabilities for system scenarios.
(3).
The system scenarios, their probability estimates and impact assessments were used to identify the areas of greatest concern and areas needing further analysis.
This approach used Ireland's definition of risk E13 as "the resultant product of probability of failure and the consequence of that failure for any preset goal." However, we treated the consequence of failure and its probability in a more quantitative manner than Ireland. The primary tool we used to estimate probabilities was cross-impact analysis. In cross-impact analysis, expert judgments are solicited on the marginal and conditional probabilities of the occurrence of factors, which are then used to generate the probabilities of future scenarios. Sarin [23 [3) proposed a method of adjusting the elicited information to produce bounds for an internally consistent set of scenario probabilities. This method has been refined by DeKluyer and Moskowitz E43 using goal programming. We used a variation of the DeKluyver and Moskowitz method to estimate probabilities for the various subsystem scenarios, that are consistent with the axioms of probability. Using these probabilities, system scenarios were generated and their probabilities estimated with a Monte Carlo simulation.
The system scenarios were used to determine the success or failure to meet the project's oojectives and the causes of failure recorded.
The formulation of the goal program is follows.
The objective function sets a goal of minimizing the maximum deviation from the elicited probabilities (DIFF).
(1) MIN: DIFF Constraint 2 and the nonnegativity conditions insure conveyity.
(2) STI Z P[S(i)] a 1.0
Where P[S(i)] is the probability of scenario S(j), for j a I to n**2.
Where n is the number of functions for the subsystem. Constraints 3 thru 5 insure additivity. Where DN(O,k) is a negative adjustment to a probability estimate and DP(j,k) is a positive adjustment to the estimate. Constraints 18 thru 21 define the probabilities of the subsystem failing to fulfill its various functions in terms of the elicited probabilities and variables which allow adjustments to be made to these estimates. Where E(j,k) is a probability estimate. If j is equal to k, it is an estimate of the marginal probability of function j failing. Otherwise it Is an estimate of function j failing given function k fails. This type of nonlinear goal programming problem can be solved using a constraint approximation method [53. All summations are performed on the variable subscripted with an i. This approach provides the basis for a management control mechanism by identifying the areas which are most likely to lead to a failure to meet DSACS objectives. The following results are produced: a. A list of scenarios and probabilities for each subsystem under the current alternative. b. The probability of meeting each DSACS objective with the current lsvel of resources. The probability of meeting DSACS objectives with different mixes of resources could also be produced, by eliciting additional probability estimates. c. A list of most likely causes of failure to meet each DSACS objective, in terms of subsystem functions.
Results
Based on interviews conducted with functional area personnel during the period 25 March 88 thru 5 May 88, the analysis was divided into two areas, the subsystems supporting planning and execution functions and a group of smaller stand alone subsystems. Results for each of these groups are given below. The probabilities for the various subsystem scenarios are in the Appendix. Greater attention was given to the Maintenance (AH) subsystem than to the other stand alone subsystems, because it was the only one with a significant probability of failing. a. Stand Alone Subsystems (1) Transportation and Traffic Management (AM). The probability of this functional area performing all its functions, by Oct 88, is 0.9. (2) Industrial Preparedness Planning(AL).
The subsystems making up this functional area are complete except for the MOB production base analysis and allocation subsystem (ALG). The construction of this relational DBMS will take at least 2 more years. (3) Quality Assurance (AG). This functional area is a stand alone system consisting primarily of migrations of existing systems, its probability of success, by Mar 89, exceeds .95. (4) Contingency Planning (AQ). This functional area consists of an inhouse migration of existing systems into DSACS. The current SIMSCRIPT and FORTRAN programs will be translated into COBOL. This functional area does not interface with any other subsystem. (5) Demands (AJ) -complete (6) Demilitarization (AK) -complete (7) Cataloging (AO) -complete (9) Maintenance (AH). This functional areas consists of six subsystems which will be used to manage and operate a wholesale maintenance point for all facets of conventional ammunition. The probabilities for this system performing its various objectives, by July 89, are shown in Figure 1 . The probability of the various functions of this subsystem being a fault when the functional area does not perform its objectives is given in Table 1 . The key for the code used for functions in Table  1 . is given in the Appendix. Analysis of the probability of fulfilling these objectives with a mix of automated and manual processing was completed, under the following three assumptions.
(1) Baseline. The probabilities generated from interviews with functional personnel were used with out any new assumptions.
(2) With Customer Acquisition Plan Entry (CAPE). The probabilities generated from interviews with functional personnel were used for all subsystems except CAPE. CAPE was assumed to function at 100 percent (3) With CAPE and Procurement Work Directive (PWD) Generation. The probabilities generated from interviews with functional personnel were used for all subsystems except CAPE and the PWD generation functions of the Major Item Plan (MIP) subsystem. These subsystems were assumed to function at 100 percent With the exception of order tracking, the probability of DSACS providing any of these objectives, by Oct 8e, is very low (see figure 2) .
However, if the two major problem areas, CAPE and PWD generation, are corrected DSACS has a reasonable probability of fulfilling these objectives with a mix of automated and manual processing. Table 3 . lists functions which can be performed manually and the objectives they support. The probability of success for theme functions can be found in the Appendix. ------------------------------------------------- 
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CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS
It is unlikely that DSACS will be able to support planning and execution functions for 100 percent of the ammunition base, by Oct 88. However, some number of items could be processed using a mixture of automation and manual effort, if the critical functions listed in Table 2 are provided. Formal walk around procedures should be developed for the functions which can be performed manuallly (see Table 3 .). Based on the number of personnel available to support these functions, a determination should be made as to the number of items the system can reasonably be expected to process, by Oct 88.
If a funding shortfall requires rationing of the remaining DSACS resources, first priority should be given to developing those functions which directly interface with SMCA customers. This Includes all of CAPE and the on-line inquiry functions of Order Tracking. Second priority should be given to the remaining critical functions in MIP and Pricing. Development of the non-critical functions listed in Table 3 . should be given the lowest priority for remaining resources. (1) SCHEDULING (2) SURVEILLANCE AIH Industrial Reaaness -AMSMC-PD The function of this subsystem will be provided with an existing system.
All CAWCF Budget -AMSMC-PD
The probability of this subsystem providing all its functions by Oct 88 is 0.9. The probability of it failing to provide any functions is 0.10.
(1) collect CAWCF data (2) compile and generate reports (1) provide DSACS with the ability to receive queries from any remote terminal on the DSACS network (2) provide DSACS network customers with the proper response to their queries AME Production Data Process (complete) -AMSMC-TM
(1) provide visibility of CAWCF MROs to the traffic manager (2) provide an automated process for retrieving transportation related data (3) compute pieces, weight and cube to be used in the production report and the Volume Movement Report (VMR) (4) provide a Production Data Report (1) act on exercise requisitions for all Services (2) automate flow planning for the wholesale inventory for all Services (3) accumulate, process and draft shipment plans for edit and approval supply actions for transmittal (4) determine ammunition readiness posture
